
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Dynamics of the Employment Assimilation of 
First-Generation Immigrant Men in Sweden:
Comparing Dynamic and Static Assimilation
Models with Longitudinal Data
IZA DP No. 4655
December 2009
Alpaslan Akay 
Dynamics of the Employment 
Assimilation of First-Generation 
Immigrant Men in Sweden: Comparing 
Dynamic and Static Assimilation 
















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 












Dynamics of the Employment Assimilation of First-Generation 
Immigrant Men in Sweden: Comparing Dynamic and Static 
Assimilation Models with Longitudinal Data
* 
 
We analyse the dynamics of employment assimilation of first-generation immigrant men in 
Sweden using a high-quality, register-based panel data set. It is discussed that when there 
are significant differences between employment status persistence of immigrants and 
natives, the standard static assimilation model produces biased predictions for the relative 
labour market outcomes for immigrants. We find significant persistence of employment status 
which differs between immigrants and natives, and also across immigrant groups. The static 
assimilation model overestimates (underestimates) the short-run (long-run) marginal 
assimilation rates. We find 10-15 percentage points lower initial employment probability 
disadvantage but the years to assimilation are 5-10 years longer compared to the standard 
static assimilation model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sweden has proportionally one of the largest immigrant populations among Western 
countries, accounting for almost 14% of the population. One of the policy targets of 
recent governments is to assimilate immigrants into the Swedish labour market as quickly 
as possible. However, previous studies report that not only was the growth of immigrant 
employment levels in Sweden weak and their employment levels quickly diverged away 
from that of native Swedes, but the labour market outcome also differed by region of 
birth, arrival-cohort and education (Ekberg, 1994, 1999; Edin et al., 2000; Scott, 1999; 
Hammarstedt, 2001, 2003; Bevelander, 1995, 2005; Bevelander and Nielsen, 2001; 
Aguilar and Gustafsson, 1991, 1994; Gustafsson and Zheng, 2006; Åslund and Rooth, 
2007; Bevelander and Lundh, 2007). Both the demand and supply side factors played 
important roles on the appearance of this result. Up until the early 1970’s the Swedish 
economy was highly dependent on foreign labour. Foreign-born individuals in Sweden 
had even higher employment rates than natives in the early 1970s; however, later 
immigration shifted to refugees and family reunification, and immigrant employment 
levels declined after this period (Bevelander, 1995, 2005; Edin et al., 2000). The 
deterioration of the immigrants’ relative employment levels was also caused by the 
structural change in the Swedish economy from industrial to service-oriented sectors 
(Ekberg, 1994, 1999; Bevelander, 2005). The structural shift increased the demand for 
employees with language and interpersonal skills, and Swedish labour market-specific 
human capital in general. Obtaining labour market-specific skills to compete in the labour 
market with natives requires a continual accumulation of labour market experience after   3
arrival. Immigrants, however, may be confronted with difficulties in obtaining it because, 
first of all, upon arrival the human capital which is acquired in the home country may not 
be perfectly transferable; and many other factors such as labour market discrimination 
and segmentation may also lead to different patterns (interruptions and continuities) on 
the employment status of immigrants and natives over time. The primary aim of the paper 
is to examine the dynamics of employment assimilation of first-generation (foreign-born) 
male immigrants in Sweden. We extend the standard static assimilation models by taking 
the effect of past labour market experience into account together with time-persistent, 
unobserved characteristics and analyse their effects on the current employment levels and 
assimilation outcome of immigrants. By estimating the employment probability outcome 
of the immigrants and natives in a standard assimilation model, our study also focuses on 
comparing the conventional assimilation models and the dynamic one suggested in this 
paper. 
 
The assimilation of immigrants is typically analysed in previous studies by using either a 
cross-section of individuals or synthetic or genuine panel data sets with static modeling 
framework (e.g. Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985, 1987, 1995; LaLonde and Topel, 1991, 
1992; Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Duleep and Regets, 1999; Aguilar and Gustafsson, 
1991; Bauer et al., 2000; Ekberg, 1994; Husted et al., 2001; Longva and Raaum, 2002, 
2003; Barth et al, 2004; Bevelander, 2005). However, the static framework (with or 
without panel data sets) cannot account for the structural and spurious factors leading to 
the persistence of employment status over time. A structural state dependence on 
employment status can be caused by past employment experiences; and a spurious state   4
dependence is due to time-persistent, unobserved, individual characteristics (motivation 
or ability), which can alter employment propensities independently from actual 
employment experience.
1 In this paper we argue that the labour market conditions faced 
by immigrants and natives may be substantially different. Thus, the effect of any 
employment (or unemployment) experience may lead to different consequences for the 
future employment experience of immigrants and natives. When the effect of any past 
employment experience (the structural state dependence) of immigrants and natives is 
significantly different, the assimilation results produced by the standard static model may 
be biased. The static model assumes that the relative employment probabilities of 
immigrants absorb the effect of past labour market experience (conditioned on time-
persistent, unobserved and observed, individual characteristics). In this paper we relax 
this assumption and control for both structural and spurious state dependence in a 
dynamic panel data random-effects probit model with endogenous initial conditions to 
analyse the dynamics of employment assimilation of immigrant men in Sweden for the 
years between 1990 and 2000. 
 
Immigrants are heterogeneous, i.e. their human capital and degree of unobserved 
characteristics differ. By separating the immigrants into seven regions of origin and 
analysing them in different models, we find very strong, positive structural state 
dependence on the employment status of native Swedes and also of immigrants. It largely 
differs between native Swedes and immigrants and also across immigrant groups. Native 
Swedes experience higher (lower) persistence due to structural reason (spurious reasons) 
                                                 
1 See Heckman (1981) for the terminology of “structural and spurious state dependence”.   5
than immigrants. The static assimilation model predicts very large marginal assimilation 
rates during the initial years after arrival, but in fact the rates are quickly turned to 
negative, as employment probabilities of immigrants widely diverge (with some 
exceptions) from those of native Swedes. Controlling for past labour market experience 
lowers both the speed of assimilation and depreciation rates of human capital at later 
stages; and thus, immigrants are able to keep their marginal assimilation rates positive for 
a longer period. The dynamic model predicts a lower initial employment probability 
advantage (10-15 percentage points) and longer total years to assimilation, which is up to 
5-10 years longer compared with the predictions of the static assimilation model. We 
could not find any evidence that there is a full employment assimilation of immigrants 
into the Swedish labour market for either dynamic or static assimilation models (except 
in some cases with different education levels). Immigrants from Nordic and Western 
countries (and secondarily Eastern Europe and Latin America) are relatively successful, 
and they are even able to reduce the employment probability gap to under 5-10 
percentage points; whereas the others are far from being assimilated into the employment 
probability levels of native Swedes. 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. The following section discusses 
the hypotheses tested in the paper and potential reasons leading to structural and spurious 
state dependence in larger detail. Section 3 gives our dynamic assimilation model and 
discusses econometric issues which can create bias in the measures of assimilation. 
Section 4 then presents the data, and Section 5 gives the empirical results by region of   6
origin and by education to examine how persistence differs with degree of human capital. 
Section 6 summarises and draws conclusions. 
 
2. Hypotheses, structural vs. spurious state dependence and assimilation 
 
The main aim of this paper is to test the so-called “assimilation hypothesis” under 
different assumptions (Chiswick, 1978; Chiswick et al., 1997; Borjas, 1985, 1987, 1995; 
LaLonde and Topel, 1991, 1992; Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Hayfron, 1998; Edin and 
Frederiksson, 2000). The hypothesis suggests that immigrants arrive at the host country 
without the human capital specific to the host country and they experience lower levels of 
employment probabilities relative to natives upon arrival.
2 However, they develop the 
necessary capital over time and they reduce the initial disadvantage and eventually 
“catch-up” with (assimilate into) the employment probability levels of natives as years 
since migration increases (Borjas, 1999; Edin et al., 2000; LaLonde and Topel, 1992). 
The literature testing this hypothesis is generally based on a static human capital model. 
In this paper we extend this approach to a dynamic framework to capture the persistence 
of the employment outcome for immigrants and native Swedes. 
 
There may be many sources leading to persistence and we have also many reasons to 
believe that the effect of some of these reasons may differ for immigrants and natives, 
even though we cannot empirically identify them separately. For instance, an 
unemployment experience in the past may be perceived by employers as a signal for low 
                                                 
2 In this paper we focus on employment assimilation; however, the literature predominantly focuses on 
earnings assimilation (Chiswick, 1978, Borjas, 1985, 1999; and many others)   7
productivity or time out for skills (Hyslop, 1999). Failure to find a job upon arrival may 
scar future job possibilities and this could reduce the bargaining power of the workers. 
Wage offers may also be lowered, which may in turn affect the labour supply decisions of 
workers.
3 Employers (or other employees in the firm) may have preferences towards 
working together with natives rather than immigrants (preference discrimination). It is 
also possible that employers may judge immigrants and natives differently, even though 
they have the same labour market experience (labour market discrimination). Job search 
costs may also differ across different participation states between natives and immigrants. 
On the other hand, as Chiswick (1978) explains, immigrants are a positively selected 
group of individuals. Their time-persistent unobserved motivation to work, abilities or 
skills may be different than natives, and these factors may also lead to different patterns 
on the employment status over time (unobserved preferences). 
 
Ignoring these dynamic aspects of labour market experience might bias the predictions 
for the employment assimilation of immigrants. The static assimilation model is silent 
about these issues because it cannot take past labour market experience into account. It is 
a special case of the dynamic assimilation model which is suggested in this paper. A 
static assimilation model controlling for the unobserved individual-effects assumes that 
“the persistence effect of past employment experience on current employment status is the 
same for immigrants and natives”. That is, the persistence difference between 
                                                 
3 In another strand of literature aiming to examine welfare take-up differences of immigrants and natives in 
Sweden, Hansen and Lofstrom (2009) find that refugee immigrants display a greater degree of structural 
state dependence than natives and non-refugee immigrants in terms of welfare participation. They 
conclude that high welfare take-up rates among refugee immigrants may be due to the existence of a 
“welfare trap”. 
   8
immigrants and natives is only due to different time-persistent, unobserved characteristics 
(conditional on the observed characteristics). Thus, relative employment-probabilities of 
immigrants absorb the effect of the persistence which is due to actual employment 
experience, i.e. structural. When the past labour market experience (or unobserved 
characteristics of immigrants and natives conditional on past labour market experience) 
has a different impact on the current employment possibilities, the relative employment 
probabilities and resulting marginal assimilation rates obtained by the standard static 
assimilation model may be biased. The size and direction of the bias would depend on the 
difference between the degree of state dependence on the employment status of 
immigrants and natives. 
 
We control for the structural and spurious state dependence and relax the assumption that 
structural state dependence is equal for immigrants and native Swedes. Thus, we examine 
whether or not the effect of past employment experience of immigrants and native 
Swedes is the same for their current employment status. We argue for instance that when 
native Swedes experience a positive and larger structural state dependence compared to 
immigrants, the static assimilation model is expected to overestimate (underestimate) the 
short-run (long-run) marginal assimilation rates. In the case of higher persistence of 
employment, the frequency of labour market transitions (from work or to work) of 
natives is lower than that of immigrants. Once they are employed, they stay in this state 
persistently. Thus, continually employed natives accumulate a higher degree of labour 
market-specific human capital than immigrants; and the existing employment probability 
differential (that is expected due to a lack of country-specific human capital of the   9
immigrants) between immigrants increases over time. In the short-run the static 
assimilation model (which ignores the factors leading to persistence) may predict that the 
immigrants are closing the employment probability differential with greater speed than is 
actually true. 
 
Once human capital is achieved, it can also be transferred to later ages with a particular 
depreciation rate. The static assimilation model is expected to overestimate the human 
capital depreciation rates too (given a positive structural state dependence), since it 
cannot truly account for the human capital transfers over time. Without the effect of the 
past as a link between past employment experience and current employment experience, 
the static model may produce a very large penalty of age in the employment probability 
levels as years since migration increase. Overall, failure to control for past employment 
experience may also affect the predictions about the assimilation outcome of immigrants 
in terms of years to assimilation. The dynamic assimilation model is expected to produce 
a slower but stabile assimilation, which lasts longer years after migration, leading to 
longer years to assimilation compared to the ones produced by the static assimilation 
model. 
 
3. Econometric specifications 
3.1. The dynamic assimilation model 
 
We specify a dynamic random-effects probit model for both immigrants and native 
Swedes by controlling for previous period employment status, observed and unobserved   10
individual characteristics, and endogenous initial values. The dynamic employment 
generating process of immigrants (I) is specified as follows:
4 
                          
        () { }
I* I I I I I I I I I
,1 0 it it i t it it j j k k it jk d x d age ysm C u βλ ϕ δ ψ θ − =+ + + + + Π + > ∑∑ 1 ,             (1) 
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where 
I*
it d  is a binary latent (unobserved) dependent variable indicating whether an 
immigrant is employed during the current period t (i is the individual and  1,..., iI = and t 
is the period in the panel data set  1,..., i tT =  (unbalanced panel));  it x is a vector of current 
socio-demographic and economic characteristics (such as educational attainment, marital 
status and non-labour income); β is the corresponding vector of parameters to be 
estimated;  , it i d −  is a (observed) binary variable indicating whether an immigrant i was 
employed in the previous period ( 1 t − ); and we will interpret the parameter λ  as 
structural state dependence following the discourse of Heckman (1981).
5 Age and ysm 
(years since migration) are two key variables for an assimilation model, and their higher 
order terms are used in the actual specification, but they are not presented here to 
simplify the notation. Immigrants arrive in different cohorts ( j C ) and unobserved cohort 
                                                 
4 The model given in (1) is a static assimilation model with unobserved individual effects when λ  is zero. 
The static model estimated here in this paper uses a similar auxiliary distribution for the unobserved 
individual effects using the Chamberlain (1984) approach. The auxiliary distribution of the unobserved 
individual effects does not include the first period employment status in the case of the static model. 
5 Note that the lagged dependent variable is assumed as observed (not latent). The other alternative is to 
consider that the lagged employment status is also unobserved. Considering the lagged dependent variable 
as observed or latent leads to different implications in both economic and estimation terms (Hsiao, 2003).   11
specific characteristics (cohort fixed-effects) are controlled for using a series of indicator 
variables indexed by 1,..., j J = ; the transitory macroeconomic fluctuations in the 
economy (such as upward or downward trend in unemployment rates during observation 
periods) may have different impacts on the employment abilities of immigrants and 
natives. In order to control for these characteristics, the period-effects, 
I
k Π , are included 
for k periods. 
 
Clearly, the model given in (1) is not identified.
6 An additional restriction must be 
imposed: either that the period-effect is the same for both immigrants and native Swedes; 
or that the cohort-effect is the same across different arrival cohorts of immigrants. The 
assumption used here is that the period-effects of immigrants and natives are the same 
(i.e. 
IN , kk k Π= Π ∀). This assumption would be credible if there were no change in 
macroeconomic conditions or even if it did change, the responsiveness of immigrants and 
natives to these changes should be the same. The important point for the current study is 
that changing macroeconomic conditions may influence the price paid for skills of 
immigrants and natives differently. Thus, if the sensitivities of immigrants and native 
Swedes are in fact different and if they are not equally affected by changing 
macroeconomic conditions, this restriction can lead to a severe bias in estimates of the 
effects of the arrival cohort and years since migration (Barth et al., 2004). Sweden (and 
the other Nordic countries) experienced a sharp economic downturn coinciding with the 
sample period, 1990-2000. Thus, the model, which assumes equal period-effects, could 
                                                 
6 The period-effects,  k Π , is a linear combination of the effects of the arrival cohort and years since 
migration, since the calendar year at any cross-section is the sum of years since migration and the year in 
which the individual immigration occurred (i.e. the arrival cohort).   12
be biased. To attempt to control for this bias, at least partially, local market 
unemployment rates are used by following the wage-curve model suggested in Barth et 
al., (2004). The wage-curve model is also restricted by the assumption of equal period-
effects. However, it is assumed that the period-effects can be identified by controlling for 
local unemployment rates (Akay and Tezic, 2007). 
 
In order to calculate the relative employment outcomes of immigrants, the dynamic 
generating process for the employment outcomes of native Swedes (N) is defined as 
follows: 
        
               () { }
N* N N N N N N N N N
,1 0 it it i t it k k it k d x d age u βλ ϕ θ − =+ + + Π + > ∑ 1 ,                              (4) 
               
NN N
it i it u η ε =+,                                                                                                     (5) 
              () { }
N* N N N
11 1 1 0 ii i dz u β =+ > 1 ,                                                                                   (6) 
 
where the variables years since migration and arrival cohorts, which are not relevant for 
the data generating process of the natives, are excluded. The definition of the other terms 
is the same as in the case of immigrants (i.e. model (1-3)). 
 
The error term in the model (1 and 4) is composed as in (2 and 5). The first part ( i η ) is 
the time-invariant (persistent), unobserved individual-effects and controlling for these 
effects is crucial in order to be able to identify structural state dependence. The second 
term ( it ε ) is the usual error term, which is assumed to have a normal distribution with   13
zero mean and unit variance due to the identification of the binary dependent variable 
model (1). Actual disturbance process is assumed as serially uncorrelated. However, in 
this model controlling for unobserved individual-effect automatically induces a serial 
correlation. The correlation between two sequential error terms is, 
22 (,) / 1 , it is Corr ηη εε σ σ =+  ( , 1,..., ; ) i ts Tt s =≠ , where 
2
η σ  is the variance of unobserved 
individual-effects. 
 
The assumption on the relation between observed and unobserved characteristics is that 
they are orthogonal to each other following the random-effects specification. However, 
the standard random-effects approach can be relaxed in practice (for instance unobserved 
test for work for an immigrant can be correlated with experience and education). This 
correlation may be controlled for by using quasi-fixed-effects (the correlated random-
effects model of Chamberlain (1984) or Mundlak’s (1978) formulation). The general way 
to do this is to use an auxiliary distribution for the unobserved individual-effects as a 
function of time-variant, observed characteristics. However, in our case this model is 
very close to how we deal with the initial values problem and it will be explained below. 
 
3.2. Estimation of the model and the initial values problem 
 
We follow a fully parameterised random-effects approach with maximum likelihood-
estimator. Such an approach requires correct specification of the distribution of initial 
values, conditioned on observed and unobserved individual-effects. The log likelihood 
function would be as follows:   14
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where  it x  is all of the observed variables on the right hand side (except the lagged 
dependent variable) of an individual i at time t; 
* β is a vector of corresponding 
parameters; and Φ is the distribution function of the standard normal random variable. 
 
The likelihood function in (7) can be easily maximised using Gaussian-Hermite 
quadrature when the conditional distribution of the initial values  {} 11 1 (| , )
T
ii t i t fd η
= x  is 
known. In order to identify the magnitude of the structural state dependence and 
disentangle it from spurious state dependence, the initial values can play an important 
role (Heckman, 1981; Wooldridge, 2005). Many immigrants (and of course native 
Swedes) entered the Swedish labour market much earlier than the study period 1990-
2000. Thus, it is assumed exogenous initial values would be too strong, causing biased 
and inconsistent estimators (Heckman, 1981). The sample initial employment states must 
instead be considered endogenous, with a probability distribution conditioned on 
observed and unobserved individual characteristics. 
 
There are two main methods for doing this: Heckman’s (1981) reduced form 
approximation and the simple method of Wooldridge (2005). Heckman’s method is based   15
on available pre-sample information with which the conditional distribution of the initial 
values to be approximated via a reduced form. This approximation allows a flexible 
specification of the relationships between initial values, and observed and unobserved 
individual characteristics. Wooldridge (2005) introduces a simple alternative to 
Heckman’s reduced form approximation. He suggests that the unobserved individual-
effects can be considered conditional on the initial values and the time-varying 
exogenous variables in a similar way to the correlated random-effects model of 
Chamberlain (1984) using an auxiliary distribution. In this paper we use the Wooldridge 
method by considering that any difference between this method and the others is very 
small for longer panels than we employ here in this paper (Arulampalam and Stewart, 
2009; Akay, 2009). The auxiliary distribution of the unobserved individual-effects for 
immigrants and natives is given as follows: 
 
                                                 
III II II
01 12 ii i i d η ππ π α = +++ x ,                                               (9) 
                                                 01 12
NNN NN NN
ii i i d η ππ π α =+ + + x ,                                      (10) 
 
where  1 i d  is the first period employment status; and  i α is the new unobserved individual-
effect, which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance and 
uncorrelated with the observed individual characteristics. The time-variant variables used 
in (9) and (10) are age, capital non-labour income and the number of children at home.   16
 
3.3. The estimators of employment assimilation 
 
We would like to calculate two measures: marginal assimilation rates ( MRA) as a 
function of years since migration and total years to assimilation (TYA). The approach 
adopted here to measure these quantities is based on the idea of assimilation having 
occurred when immigrant employment probabilities catch-up over time with the 
employment probability levels of natives (following Borjas, 1985, 1987 and 1999). An 
estimator of the marginal assimilation rate is defined simply as: 
 









,                                        (11) 
 
where  E is the expected probability of employment, conditional on observed and 
unobserved individual characteristics. The conditional expectations can be written for the 
immigrants and natives as follows: 
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In expression (12) and (13), years since migration is reparameterised with t, and  0 t  is the 
entry age to the labour market. In the paper the entry age is assumed to be 20 for each 
individual. Using (11) an estimator for MRA is obtained as:   17
 
                        n II * I
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where φ  indicates the density function of the standard normal random variable. Thus, the 
estimator of the marginal rate of assimilation in (14) shows the employment probability 
difference between an immigrant and a comparable native after t years spent in Sweden. 
For instance, when t = 0, we obtain the initial employment probability differential upon 
arrival ( (0) 0 i ysm = ). 
 
The other target measure we derive from (14) is the total years of assimilation (the time 
needed to achieve equal employment probability with otherwise identical native Swedes). 
This occurs when the conditional expectations of the immigrants and the natives are 
equal. Thus, it can be formulated in MRA terms as: 
 
          
II * I
0 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ () ( ) ( ) it i i age t t ysm t ϕδ φ β ϕ δ ⎡⎤ ++ + + ⎣⎦ x  =
NN * N
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where the estimator of the total years of assimilation is  n
i TYA t =  .
7 
 
                                                 
7 Note that all estimators are given with individual indices. They can also be calculated for a group of 
individuals by using mean values of the group of individuals. For instance, an average African immigrant 
may be compared with the average native and so on. In this paper we calculate all quantities for each 




Our data set is the Swedish register-based Longitudinal Individual Data Set (LINDA) 
between 1990 and 2000. The data set includes a population and an immigrant sample:
8 
the population sample includes 3.35% of the entire population each year and the 
immigrant sample includes almost 20% of immigrants arriving in Sweden. In Sweden 
immigrants are entered into the national register (and thus the sampling frame) when they 
receive a residence permit. In general immigrants may become a Swedish citizen after a 
sufficient number of years. The sampling frame consists of everyone who was living in 
Sweden during a particular year, including those who were born or died and those who 
immigrated or emigrated. It is updated with current household information each year with 
data from the population and housing censuses and from the official Income Register as 
well as a higher education register (for more details on LINDA, see Edin and 
Frederiksson, 2000). 
 
In order to avoid selection problems due to retirement at age 65, the 33,504 immigrant 
men aged 18-55 in 1990 were initially selected for the study as well as an equally large 
control group of randomly selected native Swedish men, matched for age and county of 
residence. The additional 20% of new immigrants, 2,000-4,000 were added each year, as 
well as an equal number of randomly selected but matched native Swedes. By 2000 these 
unbalanced panels consisted of around 65,000 immigrant men (generating 521,686 
                                                 
8 We define immigrants as those who are foreign-born (first-generation immigrants).   19
individual year observations for immigrants and 540,651 for natives). We exclude the 
self-employed, since their employment-conditions are considerably different from wage-
earners. 
 
Edin et al. (2000) point out that the measures of immigrant assimilation can be distorted 
if a significant fraction of immigrants return back to their home country. In this respect 
the immigrant sample might not be a random sample of the population of immigrants. 
Klinthäll (2003) finds that 40% of immigrants arriving from Germany, Greece, Italy and 
the U.S. leave Sweden within five years. His main hypothesis, borrowed from the U.S. 
Emigration Studies, is that the least successful immigrants leave. However, as pointed out 
by Arai et al. (2000), even low-earning immigrants might have a strong incentive to stay 
because of the relatively high living standards compared to other countries, even in the 
lower range of the earnings distribution. In our sample less than 5% disappeared from the 
data during the observation period. In any case it would be difficult to model return 
migration with this data, since it is not possible to distinguish emigrants from those who 
died. 
 
The key variable for this study is employment status. There are many different ways to 
define an indicator for employment. Whether an individual is employed or not is obtained 
from the income registers by using the gross labour income of the individuals. First we 
measure the annual gross labour income in Swedish Krona (SEK) using the income 
registers (we also inflate by the consumer price index to 2000 prices). It is easier to select 
the individuals as not working if the gross labour income is zero. We also follow Antelius   20
and Björklund (2000), who consider an individual as employed if annual earnings are at 
least 36,400 SEK. In our case it eliminates those with short employment periods or part-
time jobs with low pay.
9 Thus, based on this criterion the employment indicator ( it d ) is 
defined as 1 if the individual i at time period t is employed, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In this paper we categorise the immigrants by region of origin from: the other Nordic 
countries; other Western Countries (including the U.S., Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand); Eastern Europe; the Middle East; Asia; Africa, and Latin America. We also 
control for many socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the individuals. The 
variables are age and age squared; years since migration (and this also squared); marital 
status (cohabiting is considered as being married); number of children living at home; 
highest education level (primary education (Grundskola degree), 9 years of education; 
and secondary education (high school diploma), more than 9 but fewer than 12 years of 
education); and university education; residence in Stockholm or elsewhere; capital non-
labour income; arrival cohort; local unemployment rates; and national unemployment 
rates for the arrival year.
10 
 
Table 1a about here 
 
                                                 
9 This criterion is also adopted in LINDA as the basic amount which entitles someone to the earnings 
related part of the public pension system. 
10Local unemployment rates are calculated as follows: we first collect data from registers on the total 
number of individuals living in a municipality split by gender, age, unemployed and employed in a year. 
We first calculate the unemployment rate by dividing the number of unemployed by the population in the 
municipality of residence conditioned on age and gender for each year. This data is merged with the main 
data set using gender, age, municipality of residence and year. 
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Table 1 shows the mean values for these variables for both immigrants and native 
Swedes. The employment rate figures are very much inline with previous studies 
(Bevelander and Nielsen, 2001; Bevelander, 2005). The employment rates (83% vs. 37-
68%) are considerably higher for native Swedes. On the other hand more immigrants are 
married or cohabit (40% vs. 38-59%). Native Swedes are generally better educated: 
About 77% have at least upper-secondary education, compared to 61-77% for 
immigrants. The earlier immigrant arrival cohorts account for 9-12% of the total, whereas 
1985-89 have 18%, and 1990-94 had almost 25%. The Iran-Iraq war and various conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia occurred during these periods. The Nordic area accounted for 
25% of all immigrants, followed by the Middle East (23%), Eastern Europe (21%), and 
Western Europe (14%); Asia, Africa, Latin America each had 5-6%. 
 
The immigrant population is clearly not homogenous: employment rates are much higher 
for those from Nordic or Western countries (68% and 59%). Middle Eastern and African 
immigrants are far less likely to be employed (37% and 40%). Immigrants from non-
Nordic Western countries probably have more education than all other groups (nearly 
32% have a university degree), followed by Eastern Europeans. Despite the fact that 
Nordic immigrants, most of them from Finland, have less education, they have a higher 
employment rate and earn more than all other groups. All this is generally in accordance 
with previous studies on immigrants in Sweden. 
 
Table 1b about here 
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Table 1b reports raw transition patterns of employment status of native Swedes and 
immigrant groups for different degrees of transitions to work or from work. The second 
column presents the proportion of individuals who were employed for 11 years without 
any change in their employment status; and the third column gives the proportion of those 
employed for 0 years without any transition. Being employed in every period implies a 
binary sequence of employment status {1,1,...,1} for every period (where employed = 1 
and it is 0 otherwise). 61% of native Swedes were employed in all periods and a small 
fraction of Swedes were not employed (the sequence is {0,0,…,0} for each period) in 
each period (7.5%). Native Swedes are followed by Nordic and Western Countries, with 
a relatively high percentage of employment (44% and 34%) and relatively low percentage 
of unemployment in all periods (16% and 24%). The employment status of the other 
immigrant regions has many interruptions, and they experience very frequent transitions 
from work and to work. For instance, only 10-11% of immigrants from the Middle East 
and Africa were continuously employed in all periods and some 25-30% were not 
employed at all. 
 
The fourth column presents the proportion of individuals who experienced a single 
transition from employment to unemployment. For instance, a single transition from 
work implies a sequence of employment status {1,…,1,0,0,…,0}. These are the 
individuals who are unemployed once and stay in unemployment until the end of the 
sample period in the data. The frequency of the single transition from work is the lowest 
for native Swedes with 6.5%; and it is the highest among Nordic and Western immigrants 
at 12% and 11% respectively. A single transition to work (from unemployment to   23
employment, fifth column) implies for instance the employment status sequence 
{0,…,0,1,1,…,1}. During the sample period immigrant groups (except Nordics) 
experienced a very high degree of single transition to work. The highest is experienced 
by Eastern Europeans (28%) followed by Asians and Africans (25% and 21%). 
 
The last column gives multiple transitions of any kind. A multiple transition implies 
many combinations of the binary employment status sequences such as {0,…,1,0,1,…,1} 
and {1,…,0,1,0,…,0}. We calculate the figures in the last column by considering 
transitions which occur at least twice. Native Swedes, Nordics, Westerners and 
Easterners do not experience a high degree of multiple transitions compared to other 
immigrant groups (17%, 22% and 20%). Almost 30-35% of other immigrant groups 
experience transitions more than twice. It is very clear from unconditional data that the 
patterns of persistence and transition between immigrants and natives are substantially 
different. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
The main interest here is to determine the magnitude of the structural state dependence 
and the variance of the unobserved individual effects which are experienced by the 
immigrants and natives. We later predict relative employment probabilities of different 
immigrant groups as a function of years since migration and compare these results with 
the static assimilation models. We also show the persistence differences between   24
immigrants and natives and predict the relative employment probabilities by educational 
attainment levels. 
 
5.1. Identifying structural and spurious state dependence on employment probabilities 
 
The models given in (1-3) and (4-6) are estimated for seven regions of immigrant groups. 
The models estimated here have non-linear expected values and thus we report (Table 2a) 
the marginal effects of past employment experience on the current employment 
probabilities. The variance of unobserved individual-effects is also presented in the table 
as a proxy for the extent of the spurious state dependence on the employment 
probabilities. The results for the other parameters are in line with the literature: the 
employment probabilities increase with age at a decreasing rate; and educational 
attainment level increases the probability of employment.
11  
 
Having controlled for endogenous initial values, unobserved and observed individual 
characteristics, the coefficient of lagged employment status provides an estimate of the 
structural state dependence.
12 Table 2a suggests that there is substantial and significant 
structural state dependence on the employment status of natives and immigrants. The 
lagged employment status (i.e. being employed in previous period) is associated with a 
higher probability of being employed in the current period. Table 2a shows that natives 
                                                 
11 Estimation results are not reported here due to restrictions of space. However, they can be provided upon 
request. 
12 In order to check the sensitivity of the results we estimated some of the models with exogenous initial 
values and Heckman’s reduced form approximation. We could not find any large difference between 
Heckman’s methods and the method applied here, i.e. the Wooldridge (2005) method. This may be due 
to the long duration of the panel data set which is used (see Akay, 2009).   25
experience higher structural state dependence than immigrants. Being employed in the 
previous period increases the probability of being employed in the current period by 81% 
for the average, native, Swedish man. We observe that the state dependence experienced 
by immigrants is almost the same across groups, varying between 45% and 60%. The 
highest state dependence after natives is experienced by immigrants from Eastern Europe, 
Western countries and Latin America. It is surprising that the persistence of employment 
status is low for Nordic immigrant men, although these immigrants have very similar 
characteristics to Swedish natives, such as language, culture or geographic proximity. 
One might expect to obtain very similar persistence outcomes to Swedish natives. 
However, it is perhaps due to geographical proximity which leads Nordic immigrants to 
experience multiple immigrations or discontinuity in their working experience more often 
than any other group of immigrants. 
 
Table 2a about here 
 
Table 2a also reports the variance of the unobserved individual effects, which can be 
considered as a proxy for the extent of the spurious state dependence. In order to show 
the effect of the dynamic assimilation model on the distribution of unobserved individual 
effects, we also report the variance obtained from the static assimilation models [in 
brackets]. Conditional on the lagged employment status (and all other control variables), 
immigrants are found to be more heterogeneous in their unobserved characteristics 
compared to native Swedes (the static assimilation models suggest that only Nordic and 
Western immigrants are more heterogeneous (1.921 and 1.971 vs. 1.611)). The size of the   26
variance obtained from the static model shrinks when the model is controlled for the 
lagged employment status. 
 
5.2. Employment assimilation by region of origin and comparing the dynamic and static 
assimilation models 
 
We predict relative employment probabilities of immigrants as a function of years since 
migration and report the results in Table 2b. The figures in the table are calculated by 
using the equations given in Section 3.3.  0 20 t =  (ysm = 0) is used as labour market entry 
age, and we increase the years since migration from 0 to 45 and predict employment 
probabilities for natives and immigrants using their conditional expectations. The point 
estimate of the employment probability for a particular year since migration is obtained 
for each immigrant, and the standard errors of each individual prediction are obtained to 
calculate individual 95% confidence intervals. We then take the average of each 
individual prediction and also 95% confidence intervals to produce the average 
employment probability level and average confidence interval for a year since migration. 
In order to calculate relative employment probabilities we predict the employment 
probabilities of native Swedes as a function of age starting from age = 20 until age = 65 
with the similar strategy as the above. 
 
When year since migration is 0 and age is 20 (i.e. only the age = 20 for natives), the 
relative employment probability is the initial employment probability differential upon 
arrival and is given in the first column of Table 2b. According to the static model for   27
instance, immigrants from Nordic countries experience 10 percentage points initial 
employment probability disadvantage. In other words, the average probability of being 
employed upon arrival for a Nordic immigrant is 10 percentage points less than 
comparable native Swedes. In general, there are large differences in the initial 
employment probability gap which change between 50 and 75 percentage points for the 
other immigrant groups. The table also presents the results from the dynamic model. In 
general the dynamic assimilation model predicts a lower initial employment probability 
disadvantage (except Nordic immigrants, 20 percentage points). For instance, the initial 
employment probability disadvantage of immigrants from the Middle East is predicted at 
almost 62 percentage points which is 8 percentage points lower compared to the static 
assimilation model. The dynamic model predicts that the initial employment probability 
differential changes between 35 and 65 percentage points which are 10-15 percentage 
points lower than the static assimilation model. 
 
In Table 2b we report relative employment probabilities as a function of years since 
migration. For instance, years since migration (1-5) stands for the average employment 
probability gap experienced in one to five years after arrival.
13 Using the same strategy 
we calculate the employment probability gap five years apart until the end of an 
immigrant’s working life (age = 65). We observe some assimilation but it is very weak 
with both static and dynamic assimilation models. Almost all immigrant groups are 
somehow able to reduce the initial employment probability disadvantage in the initial 
years after arrival, at least partially. For instance, according to the static model, Middle 
                                                 
13 For instance we predict the employment-probability for every individual from ysm = 1 to ysm = 5 and 
take the average to represent the employment probability gap in one to five years after arrival.   28
East immigrants close the initial employment probability differential by almost 7 
percentage points (0.700-0.632) in 1 to 5 years, 19 percentage points (0.700-0.510) in 6 
to10 years, 25 percentage points (0.700-0.448) in 11 to15 years after arrival and so on. 
The same is also true for the dynamic model but reduction in the initial employment 
probability differential is much less over time. 
 
The last column in Table 2b presents the total years to assimilation, i.e. the years since 
migration interval in which the employment probability gap is minimised. P stands for 
partial, meaning that the gap is not fully closed. The static model suggests that the 
Eastern European immigrants minimise the employment probability differential in 15-20 
years after arrival; but the gap diverges later. The employment probability gap 
experienced by Eastern European immigrants is reduced to almost 9 percentage points. 
The same is 25-30 years and 10 years longer for the dynamic model, with 14 percentage 
points minimum employment probability difference. 
 
We observe the same pattern in every case. The static assimilation model predicts shorter 
total years to assimilation with a lower employment probability differential, but it 
diverges with greater speed. Both models suggest that there is no immigrant group which 
is able to attain employment probability level of native Swedes. The immigrants from 
Nordic and Western countries are relatively successful compared to others. They are 
followed by those from Eastern Europe and Latin America. The other three immigrant 
groups fare worst and have very large employment probability gaps and longer years to 
assimilation.   29
 
Table 2b about here 
 
We would like to analyse and show further the difference between the static and dynamic 
assimilation models by simulating the age-employment-probability profiles of 
immigrants and natives. Figure 1 presents these profiles by region of origin for dynamic 
and static assimilation models. The vertical axes in Figure 1 are the average probability 
of being employed after arrival. The market entry age is 20 (or arrival age) and thus 
simulations are performed for 45 years after arrival. The vertical lines around the age-
employment-probability profile are the average 95% confidence intervals of individual 
predictions. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Note that the only difference between static and dynamic assimilation models is that the 
dynamic model includes two more explanatory variables: the lagged dependent variable 
and the first period employment state as a part of the solution for the initial values 
problem. However, the difference between dynamic and static assimilation models is 
striking. The static assimilation model is biased and the bias changes with the degree of 
employment status persistence. The size of the structural state dependence parameter is 
an indicator of the degree of difference between the profiles obtained from the dynamic 
and static models. 
   30
The static model overestimates the initial employment probability levels as presented in 
Table 2a. It is consistent with our expectations that the static assimilation model 
overstates the short-run marginal assimilation rates and understates the long-run ones. It 
predicts very fast employment probability growth in the initial years after arrival and very 
fast human capital depreciation rates in the long-run. We also observe that when the 
structural state dependence is larger, the penalty of age is lower and the assimilation 
process is longer, with a stabile employment probability level once it is achieved. 
 
In order to portray the differences between static and dynamic models of assimilation, the 
predicted probabilities from the models are also compared with the observed 
unconditional density points of employment incidence as a function of age plus years 
since migration as in the econometric model. Figure 2 presents predicted and actual 
employment probabilities. It suggests that the dynamic assimilation model fits the actual 
data more closely than the static assimilation model. Apart from Eastern Europeans and 
Asians, the static model fails to predict early employment probabilities (0-10 years after 
arrival). The static model also fails to predict the behaviour of the long-run employment 
probabilities for all regions of origins. Briefly, the static model predicts fast employment 
probability growth and very fast depreciation of human capital in the long-run, which 
does not truly portray the actual employment behaviour in practice. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
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5.3. Education, persistence of employment and employment assimilation by education 
 
In this section we focus on the persistence of employment status and resulting 
assimilation outcome of immigrants by educational attainment levels to understand 
whether structural state dependence differs as degree of human capital changes. Models 
are estimated by splitting the data into three educational categories. They are primary 
education (Grundskola degree, 9 years of education), secondary education (high school 
diploma, more than 9 years but fewer than 12 years of education) and university degree 
or more (education more than high school).
14 We report structural state dependence 
experienced at different educational attainment levels in Table 3a. 
 
Table 3a about here 
 
The results reveal that educational attainment levels do not induce substantially different 
employment status persistence for immigrants. However, it largely differs for native 
Swedes. For instance, the structural state dependence is 0.481, 0.501 and 0.503 for the 
university, secondary and primary school-educated Nordic immigrants, respectively. The 
difference between lowest and the highest educational attainment level only induces an 
almost 2 percentage points increase in the probability of being employed in the current 
period. The highest difference by educational attainment level is experienced among 
Eastern European immigrants, after native Swedes, with 13 percentage points (0.607-
                                                 
14 One of the most significant weaknesses of the register data is that the country in which the education is 
acquired is not available. Therefore, the results do not account for the differences in educational quality 
for those immigrants who were educated partially or fully in their home country.   32
0.478). University-educated native Swedes experience almost the same structural state 
dependence with the university-educated immigrants (even lower in some cases, 
especially Western countries, Eastern Europe and Latin America). It means that 
persistence of employment status is almost the same for the university-educated 
immigrants and natives. This result also suggests that the persistence difference between 
immigrants and native Swedes found above is mainly driven by the primary and 
secondary school-educated native Swedes due to their highly persistent employment 
status. 
 
Table 3b reports relative employment probabilities by years since migration, region of 
origin and models. These quantities compare university-educated immigrants with 
university-educated but otherwise comparable native Swedes. There is full assimilation 
for some of the immigrant groups by different educational attainment, mostly with the 
static assimilation model. University-educated Nordics (in 11-15 years) and Westerners 
(in 21-25 years), secondary school-educated Eastern Europeans (in 16-20 years) are 
predicted to be fully assimilated according to the static model. Only low-skilled Latin 
Americans are able to reach full assimilation according to the dynamic model (in 36-40 
years). The age-employment-probability profiles of the natives and immigrants by 
education are presented in Figure 3. 
 
Table 3b about here 
 
Figure 3 about here 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
 
Immigrant economic integration has been predominantly studied in a static framework. It 
is found in the case of the Swedish labour market that immigrant employment 
probabilities show substantial growth just after arrival but quickly diverge and 
immigrants’ employment probabilities never catch-up with those of natives, except for 
some particular groups of immigrants. We have confirmed these results in this paper 
using a similar static assimilation model estimated in the literature. However, these 
results are based on the assumption that immigrants and natives face similar labour 
market conditions leading exactly to the same pattern of employment status over time 
conditional on employment or unemployment experience in the past (structural). These 
models also assume that the employment status persistence is only due to temporarily 
correlated, time-persistent, unobserved characteristics (spurious). 
 
The focus of this paper is to contribute to the literature by studying the dynamics of 
employment assimilation of first-generation immigrant men in Sweden using a high-
quality, register-based panel data set covering periods between 1990 and 2000. We 
estimate an assimilation model which uses a genuine dynamic panel data model 
controlling for both structural and spurious state dependence as well as many observed 
individual socio-economic and demographic characteristics. The results of the dynamic 
assimilation model are also compared with the results from a static assimilation model 
conventionally used in the literature. The models are also controlled for the local 
unemployment rate as a proxy for the changing economy-wide conditions to deal with a   34
possible bias due to identification restrictions on the period-effects. The initial values 
problem is solved using the Wooldridge (2005) method, considering that initial 
employment status of each individual is endogenous variables correlated with observed 
and unobserved individual characteristics. 
 
A substantial structural state dependence is found for the employment probabilities of 
both immigrants and native Swedes. It differs for native Swedes and immigrants, and also 
across immigrant groups. Native Swedes experience a structural state dependence almost 
1.5 times larger than most of the immigrant groups. Failure to control for structural state 
dependence (i.e. using the static instead of the dynamic model) is found to cause a serious 
overestimation of the variance for the unobserved individual-effect. 
 
The results also suggest that the static assimilation model is not able to capture the actual 
behaviour of employment experience and resulting human capital accumulation with 
years spent in Sweden. The initial employment probability disadvantage of immigrants is 
10-15% overestimated by the static model in the literature. The static model also 
overstates the marginal assimilation rates in the initial years after arrival, but fast and 
high depreciation later, thus predicting a too early and high “penalty” for the age of 
immigrants. The dynamic model predicts a slow but continuous growth of the 
employment probabilities. Total years to assimilation (whether partial or full) are thus 5 
to 15 years longer with the dynamic model. The analysis based on educational attainment 
also suggests that university educated immigrants experience very similar structural state 
dependence as native Swedes. However, a primary and secondary school education is   35
associated with very low employment transitions leading to very high state dependence 
on the employment status for natives compared to immigrants. 
  
Overall, the findings obtained in this study are not particularly encouraging with respect 
to government policy objectives. The employment assimilation of male immigrants into 
the Swedish labour market is even weaker than what has been found in the literature. 
There is a very weak assimilation process in the way immigrants are able to close the 
initial employment probability gap very little with time spent in Sweden. It is found that 
immigrants from Western and Nordic countries are relatively successful. Another two 
immigrant groups which do relatively well are immigrants from Eastern Europe and Latin 
America; but Africans, Asians and especially those from the Middle East fare worse in 
the Swedish labour market. With the exception of some immigrant groups (with high 
levels of education), we do not find any evidence of full assimilation. The main message 
given by the model which is estimated in this paper is that in contrast to the static model, 
once immigrants achieve a level of country-specific human capital, they are able to use it 
to keep their employment probability level at the same level for longer periods, although 
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Table 1a. Mean values of variables for native Swedes and immigrants by region of origin, 1990-2000 
 Native  Nordic  Western  Eastern Middle  Asia  Africa  Latin 
 Swedes  Countries  Countries  Europe  East      America 
 Log earnings   10.78 (3.73)  8.99 (5.14)  8.06 (5.51)  7.83 (5.71)  5.67 (5.58)  7.54 (5.36)  6.27 (5.53)  7.84 (5.16) 
 Employment   0.82 (0.37)  0.68 (0.47)  0.59 (0.49)  0.49 (0.50)  0.37 (0.48)  0.51 (0.50)  0.40 (0.49)  0.56 (0.49) 
              First lag of employment   0.83 (0.37)  0.69 (0.45)  0.60 (0.49)  0.47 (0.49)  0.36 (0.48)  0.50 (0.50)  0.39 (0.48)  0.55 (0.50) 
              Employment in 1990  0.83 (0.38)  0.74 (0.44)  0.61 (0.49)  0.42 (0.49)  0.38 (0.48)  0.44 (0.50)  0.36 (0.49)  0.56 (0.50) 
 Local unemployment rate  2.81 (1.18)  2.66 (1.01)  2.83 (1.26)  2.85 (1.11)  3.35 (1.55)  3.21 (1.48)  3.15 (1.34)  3.01 (1.41) 
 Age  38.7 (10.8)  40.7 (10.8)  39.2 (10.96)  38.9 (11.2)  35.6 (9.46)  33.3 (10.5)  33.1 (9.15)  35.4 (10.8) 
 Years since immigration  -  19.0 (9.40)  14.8 (9.76)  12.2 (9.64)  9.77 (6.49)  12.6 (7.62)  8.59 (6.32)  12.1 (6.80) 
 Married/cohabiting   0.40 (0.49)  0.39 (0.49)  0.47 (0.50)  0.59 (0.49)  0.55 (0.50)  0.47 (0.50)  0.44 (0.50)  0.38 (0.48) 
 Number of the children at home  1.78 (1.16)  1.61 (1.12)  1.66 (1.12)  1.81 (1.20)  1.97 (1.47)  1.70 (1.26)  1.58 (1.54)  1.69 (1.21) 
 Stockholm residence  0.22 (0.43)  0.35 (0.44)  0.39 (0.47)  0.22 (0.34)  0.37 (0.45)  0.30 (0.42)  0.40 (0.48)  0.43 (0.51) 
 Non-labour income  0.74 (2.26)  0.49 (1.83)  0.56 (1.99)  0.45 (1.76)  0.54 (1.91)  0.62 (2.03)  0.27 (1.35)  0.30 (1.44) 
 Lower–secondary     0.23 (0.37)  0.31 (0.44)  0.32 (0.46)  0.23 (0.39)  0.45 (0.48)  0.39 (0.47)  0.32 (0.45)  0.40 (0.47) 
 Upper–secondary     0.51 (0.49)  0.43 (0.50)  0.36 (0.47)  0.51 (0.50)  0.39 (0.49)  0.37 (0.48)  0.46 (0.50)  0.47 (0.49) 
 University degree       0.26 (0.43)  0.26 (0.42)  0.32 (0.46)  0.26 (0.43)  0.26 (0.43)  0.24 (0.43)  0.22 (0.41)  0.23 (0.42) 
 Arrival Cohort:             
 <1970  -  0.22 (0.44)  0.10 (0.23)  0.10 (0.29)  0.03 (0.17)  0.03 (0.19)  0.03 (0.20)  0.04 (0.25) 
 1970–74   -  0.23 (0.42)  0.17 (0.37)  0.14 (0.35)  0.04 (0.18)  0.10 (0.31)  0.04 (0.21)  0.05 (0.22) 
 1975–79  -  0.21 (0.40)  0.16 (0.36)  0.08 (0.26)  0.11 (0.31)  0.21 (0.41)  0.07 (0.26)  0.21 (0.40) 
 1980–84   -  0.09 (0.28)  0.13 (0.33)  0.10 (0.30)  0.12 (0.32)  0.18 (0.39)  0.08 (0.27)  0.18 (0.38) 
 1985–89   -  0.13 (0.33)  0.18 (0.38)  0.14 (0.34)  0.35 (0.48)  0.19 (0.39)  0.30 (0.45)  0.33 (0.47) 
 1990–94   -  0.09 (0.29)  0.17 (0.37)  0.38 (0.48)  0.29 (0.45)  0.24 (0.43)  0.42 (0.50)  0.15 (0.36) 
 1995–2000   -  0.03 (0.17)  0.09 (0.17)  0.06 (0.24)  0.06 (0.24)  0.05 (0.22)  0.06 (0.23)  0.04 (0.20) 
 Sample size  540651  131647  67641  107124  121914  28381  28432  36547 

















Table 1b. Employment status transitions by region of origin  
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Table 2a. Structural and spurious state dependence on the employment probabilities of immigrants and natives by region of origin 
 Regions 









































Note: Marginal effects of structural state dependence (λ ) and the standard deviation of the random-effects ( α σ ). The standard errors of the 
marginal effects are reported in parentheses. The model also controls for age and age squared; year since migration (and this also squared); 
marital-status; three indicator variables to control for education (primary = 1 (Grundskola degree, 9 years of education), secondary = 1 (high 
school diploma, more than 9 years but fewer than 12 years of education), university = 1 (education more than high school); large city dummy; 
number of children; log local unemployment rates; arrival year national unemployment rates; cohort fixed-effects as pre-1970, 1970-1974, 1975-
1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-2000 and pre-1970 is the base category; full set of time fixed-effects; 25 regional fixed-effects; 
first period employment status as a part of Wooldridge initial values method; mean age, mean number of children, mean capital non-labour 
income. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The figures 











Table 2b. Relative employment probabilities and years to assimilation of male immigrants by region and country of origin, 1990-2000 
(percentage points) 
Years since migration 
  Upon 
Arrival  1-5  6-10  11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40  TYA 
Nordic Countries   
    static  –0.098  –0.088  –0.074  –0.069  –0.077  –0.100  –0.146  –0.120  –0.228       11-15 (P)
   dynamic   –0.196 –0.175 –0.147 –0.128 –0.115 –0.110 –0.111 –0.120 –0.135     21-25  (P)
Western Countries          
    static  –0.567 –0.463 –0.299 –0.190 –0.136 –0.123 –0.141 –0.202 –0.319     21-25  (P)
   dynamic   –0.366 –0.322 –0.261 –0.216 –0.185 –0.167 –0.159 –0.162 –0.177     26-30  (P)
Eastern Europe          
    static  –0.732 –0.591 –0.301 –0.133 –0.088 –0.121 –0.267 –0.562 –0.801  16-20  (P)
   dynamic   –0.545 –0.447 –0.309 –0.213 –0.158 –0.151 –0.138 –0.151 –0.198   26-30  (P)
Middle East          
    static  –0.700 –0.632 –0.510 –0.448 –0.476 –0.592 –0.750 –0.852 –0.861   11-15  (P)
   dynamic   –0.623 –0.570 –0.466 –0.399 –0.364 –0.365 –0.400 –0.468 –0.561   16-20  (P)
Asia          
    static  –0.492 –0.415 –0.311 –0.259 –0.260 –0.313 –0.428 –0.599 –0.756     11-15  (P)
   dynamic   –0.425 –0.389 –0.332 –0.282 –0.239 –0.202 –0.171 –0.146 –0.126  40+  (P)
Africa          
    static  –0.747 –0.673 –0.488 –0.344 –0.298 –0.354 –0.511 –0.716 –0.380  16-20  (P)
   dynamic   –0.640 –0.557 –0.428 –0.327 –0.263 –0.239 –0.253 –0.307 –0.398  21-25  (P)
Latin America          
    static  –0.558 –0.448 –0.285 –0.193 –0.166 –0.199 –0.300 –0.482 –0.687  16-20  (P)
   dynamic   –0.420 –0.366 –0.288 –0.226 –0.178 –0.145 –0.124 –0.113 –0.114  31-35  (P)
Notes: Average employment probability differential between immigrants and natives five years apart in each case. All figures reported in the 
table are significantly different than zero at a 1% significance level. (P) is partial total years to assimilation, i.e. the year interval in which the 
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Figure 1. Age-employment-probability profiles by region of origin and models. The vertical lines are the 95% confidence intervals 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   9
Figure 2. Age-employment-probability profiles by region of origin, models and raw employment probabilities. The raw 
employment probabilities are presented with bold dashed curves. The vertical lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained by 
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Table 3a. Structural state dependence on the employment probabilities of immigrants and natives by education status and region of 
origin 
 Regions 
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Table 3b. Relative employment probabilities and years to assimilation of immigrants (by education, region of origin and model, percentage 
points)  
Years since migration   
 
Upon 
Arrival  1-5  6-10  11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30  TYA 
Nordic Countries 
dynamic 
University  -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 11-15(P)
Secondary -0.15 -0.13 -0.11  -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 16-20(P)
Primary -0.24 -0.21 -0.17  -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 21-25(P)
static                   
University  -0.28 -0.16 -0.04  -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 11-15(F)
Secondary -0.06 -0.04 -0.03  -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 11-15(P)
Primary  -0.04 -0.07 -0.10  -0.12 -0.15 -0.18 -0.24   NA 
Western Europe 
dynamic 
University  -0.25 -0.21 -0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 31-35(P)
Secondary -0.38 -0.32 -0.24  -0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 26-30(P)
Primary -0.44 -0.40 -0.36  -0.33 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 26-30(P)
static                   
University  -0.66 -0.56 -0.25 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 21-25(F)
Secondary -0.56 -0.43 -0.24  -0.13 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 21-25(P)
Primary  -0.39 -0.41 -0.42  -0.44 -0.46 -0.51 -0.57   NA 
Eastern Europe 
dynamic 
University  -0.44 -0.36 -0.26 -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 21-25(P)
Secondary -0.60 -0.48 -0.30  -0.18 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 21-25(P)
Primary -0.54 -0.49 -0.40  -0.33 -0.29 -0.26 -0.26 26-30(P)
static                   
University  -0.69 -0.58 -0.24 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.17 16-20(P)
Secondary -0.81 -0.68 -0.30  -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 16-20(F)
Primary -0.48 -0.46 -0.41  -0.39 -0.42 -0.51 -0.63 11-15(P)
Middle East 
dynamic 
University  -0.67 -0.57 -0.42 -0.32 -0.28 -0.30 -0.37 16-20(P)
Secondary -0.66 -0.58 -0.48  -0.40 -0.35 -0.33 -0.35 21-25(P)  14
Primary -0.56 -0.52 -0.47  -0.43 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 26-30(P)
static                   
University  -0.72 -0.70 -0.45 -0.26 -0.24 -0.36 -0.66 16-20(P)
Secondary -0.76 -0.68 -0.51  -0.41 -0.41 -0.51 -0.68 11-15(P)
Primary  -0.52 -0.53 -0.53  -0.56 -0.63 -0.71 -0.79   NA 
Asia 
dynamic 
University  -0.50 -0.43 -0.34 -0.26 -0.21 -0.17 -0.14 40+(P)
Secondary -0.42 -0.38 -0.32  -0.27 -0.23 -0.18 -0.16 40+(P)
Primary -0.41 -0.38 -0.33  -0.29 -0.25 -0.21 -0.17 40+(P)
static                             
University  -0.75 -0.75 -0.46 -0.19 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 26-30(P)
Secondary -0.56 -0.42 -0.24  -0.16 -0.15 -0.20 -0.33 16-20(P)
Primary  -0.28 -0.31 -0.35  -0.41 -0.51 -0.63 -0.76   NA 
Africa 
dynamic           
University  -0.50 -0.45 -0.38 -0.32 -0.29 -0.28 -0.29 21-25(P)
Secondary -0.70 -0.59 -0.41  -0.27 -0.18 -0.15 -0.17 21-25(P)
Primary -0.61 -0.54 -0.45  -0.38 -0.33 -0.36 -0.41 16-20(P)
static                             
University  -0.61 -0.57 -0.42 -0.31 -0.28 -0.34 -0.49 16-20(P)
Secondary -0.83 -0.76 -0.45  -0.18 -0.09 -0.11 -0.26 16-20(P)
Primary  -0.55 -0.55 -0.55  -0.56 -0.62 -0.71 -0.78   NA 
Latin America 
dynamic           
University  -0.25 -0.23 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23 -0.26 11-15(P)
Secondary -0.47 -0.40 -0.30  -0.21 -0.15 -0.11 -0.09 36-40(P)
Primary -0.46 -0.41 -0.32  -0.25 -0.18 -0.12 -0.07 36-40(F)
static                   
University  -0.67 -0.57 -0.28 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.23 16-20(P)
Secondary -0.69 -0.54 -0.30  -0.13 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 21-25(P)
Primary -0.40 -0.37 -0.34  -0.32 -0.36 -0.45 -0.59 11-15(P)
Notes: Bold figures indicate that the employment probabilities of an immigrant group exceed those of native Swedes. All figures reported in the 
table are significantly different to zero at the 1% significance level. F indicates full assimilation, P partial assimilation. NA  is “not applicable”.    
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Figure 3. Age-employment-probability profiles by education, region of origin and models. The vertical lines are the 95% confidence 
intervals obtained by averaging the individual confidence intervals around the point estimates of employment probabilities. See also 
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